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Can the EP be expected to provide leadership?
Conceptions of leader democracy
The connection between leadership and democracy is an elemental and universal problem at the centre of modern theories of democracy, delegation and representation. As Saward (2003:66) notes: Ôeach of the classic writers (on representative democracy) is quite clear É that democracy is about leadership and leadership selection and election, not popular politics or popular participationÕ. The fundamental issue in any polity that wishes to sustain its ÔdemocraticÕ credentials is to ensure that where leaders lead followers will follow. In other words a minimum normative requirement in a ÔdemocracyÕ is a linkage of accountability between leaders and led. This linkage historically has been founded upon processes of delegation Ôin which those authorized to make political decisions conditionally designate others to make decisions in their name and placeÕ (MŸller et al 2003:19) . This is the essence of political representation (see Pitkin 1967; Judge 1999) . In the more contemporary language of agency theory the primary challenge facing representative systems of government is to minimize Ôagency lossÕ Ð that is the difference between what the principal (elector) wants and what the agent (decision maker) delivers (see Lupia 2003:35-6) . Effective leadership would normally assume a substantial degree of congruence of policy preferences with its followership, and, where a lack of policy consensus occurred, some mechanism for restoring policy congruity should be available.
These basic requirements are reflected in KšršsŽnyiÕs (2005) characterisation of Ôleader democracyÕ. This provides a Ôminimalist conception of democracyÕ (2005:360) , in which leaders are selected by competitive elections; where the aspirations and ambitions of politicians guide public policy-making rather than the preferences of the electorate; and where politicians seek to shape and produce political preferences in order to gain support. In this sense, the meaning of political representation Ôis not deliberation or mirroring, but rather leadership, i.e. acting and supplying new policies, creating a new qualityÕ (KšršsŽnyi 2005:364) . Ideas of delegation, as featured in principal-agent notions of representation, are thus inverted to mean that Ôthe primary actors É are not the voters, but the political leaders for whom the citizens have the potential to voteÕ (KšršsŽnyi 2005:367) . In this statement two essential characteristics of leader democracy are revealed: first that the system may be deemed ÔdemocraticÕ in so far as leaders are authorised and controlled through the process of elections; and, second, that, within the parameters defined by the electoral process, leaders are granted a realm of independent action. In which case leader democracy is a form of Ôrepresentative government with democratic elementsÕ (KšršsŽnyi 2005:377) .
It privileges executive action and government institutions, whether prime ministers and cabinets derived from and responsible to an elected parliament, or presidents with a direct mandate and responsibility to the electorate. In a Ôleader democracyÕ electors are essentially conceived as reactive ÔfollowersÕ. They react to a political agenda set, and policy preferences articulated, by elected leaders. Leaders become policy entrepreneurs creating new demand by supplying new policies (Schumpeter [1943 (Schumpeter [ ] 1976 KšršsŽnyi 2005:367) .
The role of representative legislatures is, therefore, to authorise and hold to account executive ÔleadersÕ, Ôthe subject of representation is the chief executive and not the assemblyÕ (KšršsŽnyi 2005:375) . ÔA leader É represents; the leader as a person is authorized to act, and he himself is responsible for the performance of government and accountable to the electorateÕ (KšršsŽnyi 2005:375) . This approximates to SchumpeterÕs notion of democracy as selection between competitive elites (see Schumpeter [1943 Schumpeter [ ] 1976 . What is clear from this discussion is that representative parliamentary institutions would not of themselves be expected to provide ÔleadershipÕ but merely provide the legitimating frame (of authorisation and responsiveness) within which executive leadership could be exercised. This is a model of representative government (see Judge 1999:13-20) . It is a model which links leaders and followers by mechanisms of choice rather than imposition (see Pitkin 1967:107-11; Saward 2003:40) . Authentic, contested electoral choice over the tenure of leadership positions thus serves as a basic and fundamental distinction between democratic and authoritarian regimes.
If political leadership can be accommodated to and justified by notions of representative government Ð as it is at the level of the nation state Ð the question then arises of whether leadership in the EU can be justified in a similar manner. The short answer is that, in the absence of an identifiable government or an executive directly authorised by and accountable to the EP, the EU does not conform to the Ôleader democracyÕ model. Executive leadership in the EU cannot be legitimated in terms of its inter-institutional relationship with a directly elected assembly and, hence, is not analogous to representative government at the level of the nation state. Other forms of legitimation of leadership thus have to be modelled in the case of the EU. These alternative sources of leadership Ð most importantly the Commission, the European Council, Presidencies of the Council, and coalitions of member states Ð are all examined elsewhere in this volume (see also Cini 1996:19-22; Nugent 2001:202-34; Westlake and Galloway 2005; Janning 2005:822-5; de Schoutheete 2006:49) . So what remains to be considered in this chapter is the contribution of the EP to leadership in the EU Ð both actual and potential.
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The following discussion is structured in three parts. The first examines the circumstances under which the EP has exerted direct leadership (the Ôvision thingÕ). The second examines attempts by the EP to control the activities and policy preferences of identified leaders (most particularly the Commission) and so exert Ôindirect leadershipÕ through accountability (the Ôaccountability thingÕ). The third examines the attempts by the EP to politicise technical decision-making and so exert Ôpolicy leadershipÕ (the Ôpolicy thingÕ).
The vision thing
ÔThree individuals, all French have contributed most to shaping the EUÕ (Dinan 1999: 37) . own way underlined the simple fact that a conception of leadership entails institutional resources and opportunity structures (see Beach 2005:26-34) . Historically in the EU, these resources and structures have been associated with the Commission, the Council of Ministers and, increasingly, the European Council. In terms of Ôhistory-making decisionsÕ concerned with changing the EU Ð its size, membership, competences, financing, institutional balance and decision-making procedures Ð these institutions dominate the discussion of leadership (see Peterson and Bomberg 1999:34) . It might seem perverse, therefore, to claim that the EP has a right to be considered as providing leadership in history-making decisions. Nonetheless, a case can be made that the EP has contributed leadership in the sense of constitutional entrepreneurship, and in providing a broad political vision for the development of the EU.
If we start with the Constitutional Treaty that proved too visionary to be adopted, Beach (2005:207) observes that the Ôfingerprints of the EP are scattered throughout the Constitutional Treaty, and in many ways it reads like an updated and lengthened version of the EPÕs draft treaty establishing the European Union from 1984Õ. One possibility of course is that this is merely coincidence, and that the nature and intent of the Constitutional Treaty would have taken its present form independently of the vision sketched by the EP in 1984. provide such occasions. At such times the EP was able to provide Ôopportunistic political leadershipÕ in accordance with DinanÕs view that the Ôhistory of European integration demonstrates the importance of (such) leadership at a time of fluctuating economic and political fortunesÕ (Dinan 2003:37) .
Moreover, as part of an evolving institutional structure with clear incentives to influence the EUÕs developing institutional design (see Corbett et al 2005) , these interjections have been conceived as a normal part of the EPÕs role. As much was recognised by Haas (1958) in his observations that parliamentarians at the European level would be Ôcrucial actors on the stage of integrationÕ (Haas 1958:390) . This was because they had incentives to Ôdeliberately and self consciously seek to create a federal Europe by prescribing appropriate policy for the High AuthorityÕ (1958:390) ; and also to stimulate Ôthe conclusion of new treaties looking toward integrationÕ. Moreover, in their daily conduct MEPs would have the Ôfacility of furthering the growth of practices and codes of behaviour typical of federationsÕ (1958:390) .
Proponents of direct elections maintained at the time that the dynamic towards an integrationist leadership role would be enhanced further in a directly elected parliament (see 
Draft Treaty on European Union
Once direct elections were effected, the EP sought to assert its constitutional leadership role.
Initially the majority of newly elected MEPs in 1979 were predisposed in favour of taking Ôsmall stepsÕ and of developing the role assigned to them by the existing Treaties. Within a very short period, however, the inability of existing European institutions to deal with the problems arising from Ôeuro sclerosisÕ led to demands for comprehensive constitutional reform both from within and outside of the EP (see Capotori et al 1986:9-10) . In these circumstances, in the vacuum left by other leadership institutions and a debilitating constellation of national interests, the EP was able to map out a distinctive constitutional future for Europe.
The creation of a subcommittee of the EPÕs Political Affairs Committee in 1979 to deal with institutional issues, and the production of eight reports and seven resolutions by July 1981 (see Corbett 1998:130-33) , prompted the German-Italian initiative Ð the GenscherColombo Proposals Ð in November 1981. Emilio Colombo, the Italian Foreign Minister, in fact, had chaired the EPÕs Committee when it started to examine these institutional issues and his joint initiative reflected significant proposals made in the EPÕs earlier resolutions. These proposals constituted a draft European Act and sought to identify the principles and institutional reforms that would enhance European integration without a formal revision of the Treaty of Rome.
In parallel to the Genscher-Colombo initiative, to which the EP offered its strongest support, 170 MEPs signed a motion in July 1981 calling for fundamental reform of the EC. In the same month a new Committee on Institutional Affairs was created. The sole task assigned to this Committee was to draft a new constitutional framework for the EC (Lodge 1984:378) . This third option is characterised in the dual strategy of small steps and qualitative leaps (see Judge and Earnshaw 2003:40-65) . This strategy has long been recognised by close observers of the EP, but more recently some have sought to portray this as a Ônew theoryÕ of Ôagenda setting through discretion in rule interpretationÕ (Hix 2002:259 ; see also Farrell and HŽritier 2002) . In fact, there is little that is novel other than the terminology. The essence of the new theory remains that:
When parliamentary powers are initially established É these are usually limited.
However, parliaments invariably utilize these powers to the maximum extent possible, and far beyond anything that was originally intended in the initial transfer of authority. When 253 it comes to changing the constitution, these de facto interpretations are codified and so on. (Hix 2002:280) The important point is that the EP has Ôexercised independent discretion in interpreting ÉrulesÕ (Hix 2002:273) and has been able through Ônew institutional rules and strategic behaviourÕ (Hix 2002:279) to lead member state governments to concede more powers to the EP. Even if the overall vision was not subscribed to as a comprehensive package by other EU leaders, the EP still managed to secure specific, limited Ð but ultimately cumulative Ð changes to institutional structures. As a catalyst for change the EP provided remorseless ideational leadership (vision) but often limited, direct practical capacity (practical leadership) through contributions to IGCs to effect constitutional change in the intervening decades between Draft Treaty and Constitutional Treaty. (For a less visionary approach to constitutional innovation, see Chapter 11 above).
The Ôaccountability thingÕ
Without a government (or opposition), the Union often seems unable to steer the European project in a decisive, committed way. (Peterson and Shackleton 2006:12) The Commission was envisaged in the original treaties as the steering institution, being conferred with the sole right of legislative initiative. This agenda setting role has marked out the Commission as a prime candidate to fulfil a strong leadership role in the EU. The actual extent to which it has performed this role in practice is the source of heated and prolonged disputation. There is, however, a forceful argument which maintains that the leadership role of the Commission would be enhanced by transforming it into an institution more akin to a national government, and attuning the EU to the precepts of representative government. As It is not the intention here, however, to review the debate about authorisation through appointment; other than to note that, without a seismic shift in the balance between national and EU party politics, without the linkage of the presidency appointment process to the partisan composition of the EP, and without the development of European-wide ÔmandatesÕ and ÔmanifestosÕ Ð such authorisation, in the sense of the electoral connection of the Presidency of the Commission to a parliamentary majority, is likely to remain an aspiration rather than a practical reality (see Judge and Earnshaw 2003:313) .
What should also be noted about the notion of prior authorisation is the idea that the 
The Ôpolicy thingÕ
Implicit within the preceding discussion is the fact that leadership in the EU is often plural rather than singular. It is invariably about one or more institutions forming Ôleadership coalitionsÕ or Ôentrepreneurial coalitionsÕ (Zito 2000:39-45) , or transgovernmental bargaining among member states (Janning 2005:821-33) , or Ômanaging networksÕ (Schout and Jordan 2005: 210) or combinations of these modes, to generate new policy initiatives or to prompt a realignment of interinstitutional interactions. This is in contrast to Ôautonomous policy leadershipÕ and the Ôpassionate commitment to a É policy questÕ (Wallis and Dollery 1997:19) . When it comes to Ôpolicy leadershipÕ, therefore, it is unrealistic to expect a singular EU institution to offer or provide undifferentiated, unmediated leadership across the range of EU policies. This is certainly the case with the European Parliament. (2003)). But the Ôfirst puzzleÕ is to explain Ôthe substantial policy influenceÕ of a number of actors (of which the EP is one) normally not accorded much importance in (integrationist) accountsÕ (Zito 2000:4) . While the EP has been treated traditionally as a Ôlesser actorÕ (along with smaller member states) it has, nonetheless, Ôperformed the important leadership roleÕ in certain areas of environmental policy (Zito 2000:4) . This view finds corroboration in LenschowÕs (2005:315-6) statement that: ÔTraditionally the EP has been the ÒgreenestÓ of the three main policy-making bodiesÉ. Even prior to its direct election it had pushed the Commission to propose environmental policyÕ. In part, this has been due to ÔagencyÕ Ð to the commitment of environmentally minded MEPs, acting both individually, and collectively in the institutional form of its Environment Committee (see Judge 1993:209) .
In part, in the early days, this was because of the nature of environmental issues and the policy space open to EU interventions. In part, also, it was because of the linkage between the promotion of environmental initiatives and the institutional status of the EP at any given time.
Indeed, Jordan (2002:111) makes this connection in his observation that there is Ôno distinction between ÒhighÓ politics of treaty negotiation and ÒlowÓ politics of daily policymaking; the two are reciprocally and recursively interconnectedÕ (Jordan 2002:111) . This point is reinforced in JordanÕs statement that: ÔAs the most environmentally ambitious institutionÕ the EP has used Ônew institutional rules to strengthen EU environmental policyÕ (2002:24) .
Yet there remains the puzzle that, despite the leadership role of the EP in certain areas of environmental policy and at certain times, in other policy areas and at other times, its capacity to influence the direction of policy has been limited (see Chapter 4 above). One explanation is 258 that in Ôheavily technical subjectsÕ Parliament is limited to a more reactive role simply because it Ôlacks sufficient expertise and policy-making resources to innovate in the technical areas and, therefore, takes a reactive roleÕ (Zito 2000:133-4) . This loops back to McCormickÕs (2001:114) belief that on highly technical issues the EP will be confined to the role of follower rather than leader. In this respect ParliamentÕs capacity to ÔsetÕ policy is constrained by the decision processes and nature of interinstitutional bargaining associated with particular legislative proposals (see Peterson and Bomberg 1999:16-24) . In many technical areas (classification of hazardous waste etc), Parliament is constrained to examining tightly bound legislative packages after technical solutions have been defined by experts in the Commission and in working groups of national experts. In other areas, however, the EP helps to ÔshapeÕ the broader contours of policy. One instance of this capacity to shape policy is provided by the development of the 2000 Water Framework Directive (WFD).
Shaping policy: the case of water policy
Concern about the tendency of EU environment policy to develop in an ad hoc and disjointed fashion was articulated by the Commission in its 2005 proposal to pursue Ôthematic strategiesÕ on air pollution, the marine environment, the sustainable use of resources, waste and recycling, pesticides, soil and the urban environment. As Environment Commissioner Dimas (2005:1) admitted to his Commission colleagues, the thematic strategies were intended, rather belatedly, to move EU environment policy Ôfrom a complex array of individual pieces of legislation to policy and legal frameworks which can be adjusted flexibly in response to the changing state of the environment, technological progress and the geographic diversity of the enlarged UnionÕ. Dimas added that the thematic strategies were intended to be the over-arching policy framework. What is notable for the purposes of the present argument, however, is that the WFD provides an example of sustained policy leadership by the EP and reflects the EPÕs assumption of ÔleadershipÕ in EU water policy dating back to the early 1990s. In this decade ParliamentÕs leadership helped not only to ÔshapeÕ but also to ÔsteerÕ the direction of policy.
Notably, it did so despite the CommissionÕs predilection at the time for developing water policy on the basis of incremental, separate and, ultimately, disjointed legislative proposals.
Evidence to support this claim can be found in the 1996 report from the EPÕs Environment Committee on the CommissionÕs proposal to amend an existing directive on bathing water quality. The CommitteeÕs rapporteur, Doeke Eisma (Liberal/ Netherlands), in presenting his report, noted how the EP had used its powers to delay scrutiny of the legislative proposal for over two years in order to press the Commission to establish a coherent legislative framework for water. With little exaggeration, he maintained that: Ôin these two and a half years we have completely revised the whole of the European policy on waterÕ (EP Debates 11 December 1996). Indeed, the EP had outlined its ultimate objective Ð of securing recognition by the Commission of the need for a framework directive on water policy Ð in a further report in We realized a long time ago that water policy in Europe is a rather hit-and-miss affair, and there is no point in continuing to draw up reports on groundwater, surface water or bathing water if we do not have at least a basic water policy at Union level É. we need some kind of framework programme to form the basis of our future water policy.
É we reached a sort of agreement with the Commission that you would provide a written assurance that you will include this new combined approach of emission standards and quality objectives in the framework directive to be drafted over the 260 next few months. We are delighted that you are prepared to do so, since these are the very building-blocks on which our water policy needs to be based. ( biotechnology. Yet, it was not until the 1998 directive that the European Group on Ethics in Science and New Technologies (EGE), which had developed out of the Group of Advisers, was effectively institutionalised in Ôbiotechnology governanceÕ. Notably, the EGE openly acknowledged the significant contribution of the EP in its institutional development: the existence of the EGE was enshrined in law as a result of a parliamentary amendment during the adoption of the Directive on the legal protection of biotechnological inventions. (EGE 2000:8) In this manner, the EP helped to reformulate the agenda to include the ÔpoliticalÕ and ÔethicalÕ concerns of ÔfollowersÕ Ð of ordinary citizens and organised publics Ð who had been excluded initially from the ÔshapingÕ of policy on biotechnology patenting. The fact that these concerns were many, varied and inherently conflictual (in the sense that there were manifest ideological and partisan divisions within the EP itself, which reflected much broader, fundamental divisions within organised publics in the EU) prompted the EP, as part of its strategy for agreeing to the proposal, to press a compromise upon the Council and the Commission. This compromise, to give bioethics formal institutional recognition in the EU, was initially unacceptable to both institutions. Exactly how, and the conditions under which, the EP fulfilled this entrepreneurial role are beyond the scope of the present discussion (see Earnshaw and Wood 1999:294-307; Judge and Earnshaw 2003:260-1) . Importantly, however, the EP served as the primary arena for deliberation on the ethical dimensions of the draft directive. It connected the broader political concerns of ÔfollowersÕ to the technical perspectives of ÔleadersÕ in the field of biotechnology; and transformed the future agenda of biotechnology policy to include consideration of bioethics.
Conclusion
If the preceding discussion has brought the EP into the discussion of leadership in the EU, the EP still languishes at the peripheries of that discussion. The focus of most academic analyses remains the Commission, Council, European Council and member state governments. All that is being claimed here, therefore, is that the EP has a historic right to be considered alongside these other institutions in providing vision, accountability and policy direction. That it has not done so consistently and comprehensively is not in dispute. Nonetheless, the EP has participated in leadership coalitions in the past and is likely to provide leadership in the future. Similarly, in terms of the Ôaccountability thingÕ, the promotion of the linkage of elected leaders to their ÔfollowersÕ in the demoi of the EU will continue to guide the EPÕs institutional vision in the twenty-first century. The EP has consistently Ômade the case for better democratic control and accountability at European levelÕ (PE 347.119 2004:13) and will continue to do so in the future. Already, despite a firmer grip on the tiller (to continue the ÔsteeringÕ metaphor) of the selection of the Commission President, the EP envisages further increments of Commission accountability. Andrew Duff (ALDE/UK) noted, for example, in his report for the Constitutional Affairs Committee on the guidelines for the approval of the European Commission that: it is clear that there is room for considerable improvement in the procedures if we are to ensure in the future a greater degree of fairness between the candidates, a more robust dialogue between the Commission and the Parliament, and a sharper verdict. In any case, some revision will be required to reflect the greater powers the Parliament will enjoy once the Constitution is in force. (PE 355.359 2005:15) This inbuilt dynamic for institutional reinvigoration also finds reflection in the Ôpolicy thingÕ.
The EP pursues a constant quest for participation in the full range of EU competences in which it can aspire to shape policy. Yet, even after the Constitutional Treaty, the EP would still remain a vocal spectator in many policy areas, shouting at the main players from the treaty prescribed sidelines and desperate to change the rules of the game to enable the playing field to be expanded to include direct parliamentary participation. Perhaps the most obvious example is the area of European Security and Defence. This is claimed to be the Ôlast major Òconstruction siteÓ in the building of the European UnionÕ (PE 341.376 2004:44) and is an area from which the EP has traditionally been excluded (see Chapter 7 above). Even here, however, the EP seeks to carve out a potential leadership role by stressing the notion of the ÔdemocratisationÕ of policies. It propounds the normatively unassailable position (see Lord and Beetham 2001; Rittberger 2004; Maurer et al 2005) that ÔEuropean security and defence policy requires wide parliamentary legitimisationÕ (PE 341.376 2004:44) . This general claim of ÔlegitimisationÕ has enabled the EP Ôto gain considerable groundÕ already in the strongly intergovermentalist area of Common Foreign and Security Policy (Maurer et al 2005:4) .
These gains have been made on the basis that Ôin all EP documents, the prevailing belief is that according to Òthe principles of parliamentary democracy, which are amongst the most fundamental values of the EUÓ, only the EPÕs participation supplies European foreign policy with sufficient democratic legitimisationÕ (Maurer et al 2005:16) . The certainty is that the EP will seek to secure greater transparency and accountability in these areas in the future (as it has in other areas in the past), and it will use creative procedures (of internal rules of procedure, interinstitutional agreements, etc (see Kietz and Maurer 2007) ) to extend parliamentary competencies and, ultimately, to claim a role in ÔsteeringÕ EU policies. In advancing this claim the EP will simply be guided by the recognition that legitimate ÔleadershipÕ requires informed and participative ÔfollowershipÕ. Whereas other EU institutions can provide the former, only a directly elected supra-national institution can offer the prospect of securing the latter.
